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Price and Probability: Decomposing the
Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions
VICENTE CUÑAT, MIREIA GINÉ, and MARIA GUADALUPE∗
ABSTRACT
We study the effects of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) on the takeover probability,
the takeover premium, and target selection. Voting to remove an ATP increases both
the takeover probability and the takeover premium, that is, there is no evidence of
a trade-off between premiums and takeover probabilities. We provide causal esti-
mates based on shareholder proposals to remove ATPs and address the endogenous
selection of targets through bounding techniques. The positive premium effect in less
protected firms is driven by better bidder-target matching and merger synergies.
ANTI-TAKEOVER PROVISIONS (ATPS) SUCH as staggered boards, dual-class
shares, poison pills, and similar governance mechanisms have been found to
affect firm value (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Cuñat, Giné, and
Guadalupe (2012)).1 In the context of the takeover debate, proponents argue
that ATPs create value by allowing managers to negotiate a higher price in
the event of a hostile bid and encouraging more long-term investment (Stein
(1988), Harris (1990)). However, they may also reduce or delay the possibility
of a takeover (Ryngaert (1988), Pound (1987), Malatesta and Walkling (1988),
Comment and Schwert (1995), Karpoff, Schonlau, and Wehrly (2017)). The
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trade-off between the price (i.e., premium) and the probability of a takeover
has become common wisdom and accepted as fact.
The goal of this paper is to provide causal estimates that allow us to as-
sess the extent of the trade-off between price and probability, and to identify
the types of mergers that ATPs deter versus allow to happen. We also aim to
identify the channels through which firm-level ATPs create or destroy value
for firms and for the economy as a whole. Establishing causal effects is impor-
tant given the evidence of endogeneity of governance structures (Schoar and
Washington (2011), Karpoff, Schonlau, and Wehrly (2017)) and the potential
of mergers and acquisitions to create or destroy value (Morck, Schleifer, and
Vishny (1990), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi
(1998), Schoar (2002)).
We start by showing that the expected gains from adopting ATPs can ac-
crue to shareholders in three ways. The first is the effect of such provisions
on the probability of being acquired (i.e., the deterrent effect). The second is
the effect on the premium paid conditional on a successful acquisition. This is
based on the price paid for the target at auction, which is determined in turn
by the relative bargaining power of the parties, the degree of competition (i.e.,
number of bidders), and the potential for synergies. Note that the effect is ex
ante ambiguous: for example, if ATPs give managers more bargaining power,
removing them should result in a negative effect on the premium while if they
attract less competition, removing them implies a positive effect (Bulow and
Klemperer (1996)). The third is the selection effect, whereby an ATP changes
the population of firms that become targets. For example, the additional firms
that end up being taken over because they dropped an ATP may be those with
the lowest (highest) potential for value creation, implying negative (positive)
selection. The first two effects have been the focus of existing research, as they
are important determinants of shareholder value. The third, albeit seldom dis-
cussed, is also important, as one cannot infer the takeover premium by compar-
ing firms that are taken over with and without ATPs because the population
of target firms changes when such provisions are in place.2
To provide causal estimates of the components of the expected premium in
this setting requires some form of random assignment in the adoption of ATPs.
We employ two different specifications. The first is a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) for the takeover probability and expected premium. We use data
on all shareholder-sponsored proposals (2,882 proposals in 927 different firms)
to remove an ATP voted on at annual meetings of S&P 1500 firms between
1994 and 2013. We rely on vote outcomes being random in a narrow interval
around the majority threshold, leading to a discrete change in the probabil-
ity of dropping a provision (see Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012, 2013)).
The second specification is a matching estimator that is validated using the
2Note that most existing studies focus on effective (conditional) takeover premiums that are
conditional on a takeover offer being made. Since premiums do not exist in the absence of a
takeover bid, changes in these “conditional” premiums are subject to selection bias, as we discuss
below.
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identification strategy proposed by Angrist and Rokkanen (2015).3 Since the
two estimation strategies rely on a different set of assumptions, our study
contributes to our understanding by providing consistent results across dif-
ferent techniques that evaluate the effects at different points of the sample.
Even when armed with a source of exogenous variation, we still need to cor-
rect for selection problems inherent in the estimation of the conditional pre-
mium given the co-determination of premiums with the population of firms
taken over. We use the bounding estimation strategy proposed by Lee (2009)
to estimate upper and lower bounds for the effect of ATPs on the takeover
premium. Because we need a distribution of premiums to apply the bounding
technique, which cannot be done at the exact discontinuity, we provide two
sets of results for the conditional premium using Lee bounds. The first is on
the full sample using validated matching (Angrist and Rokkanen (2015)) and
the second is in an interval around the discontinuity.
Across specifications and samples, we find that voting to remove an ATP has
a significant positive effect on both the probability of a firm being taken over
and the future takeover premium. At the majority threshold (classic RDD),
passing a proposal to drop an ATP increases the likelihood of a takeover within
five years by 9.2% (1.8% per year) and increases the expected value of future
takeover premiums by 4.1%. For firms away from the discontinuity, the ef-
fects are smaller but also positive and significant: voting to remove an ATP
increases the probability of a takeover within five years by 4.1% (0.8% per
year) and increases the expected value of future takeover premiums by 2.6%.
These results are intent to treat (ITT) effects that measure the effect of pass-
ing a proposal. In Section V, we discuss possible calculations of the effect of the
provision itself (treatment on the treated). We also show that the results are
similar across different definitions of the share of votes passed (in particular,
the different treatment of abstentions across votes).
Total shareholder gains can be expressed as an unconditional premium that
includes both firms that experience a takeover (and realize a takeover pre-
mium) and those that do not (with a takeover premium of zero). The effect on
the expected unconditional premium is not subject to the inherent selection
problem of the conditional (i.e., realized) takeover premium because the popu-
lations of the treatment and control groups are comparable. However, we would
also like to determine whether a given firm is able to obtain a higher or lower
premium if it drops the ATP and a merger does happen. To do so, we cannot
simply compare the premiums of firms taken over with or without ATPs, as we
can only observe takeover premiums for the firms that are taken over and we
need to account for different selection patterns in the two groups. We therefore
use the bounds methodology developed by Lee (2009) to provide estimates that
3 Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) build on the fact that in the regression discontinuity design, we
observe the assignment variable (the vote in our case), which is the only source of heterogeneity.
They propose a matching estimator and use the regression discontinuity approach as a tool for
validating the conditional independence assumption of the model. We explain the method and
intuition further in SectionIII.
4 The Journal of Finance®
account for selection. Across different specifications and samples (for different
intervals around the discontinuity as well as for the full sample), we find that
the effect of voting to remove a provision on the conditional premium is never
negative and can be as high as a 15% four-week premium, suggesting that
more shareholder value is created in less protected firms. This effect is rela-
tively large compared to other effects that the literature finds to be relevant.
For example, Eckbo (2009) shows that, in the cross-section, the average differ-
ence in premiums between a hostile takeover and a friendly takeover is 5.8%,
the average difference in premiums between a public and a private acquirer is
4.9%, and the average difference in premiums between a multiple bidder and
a single bidder contest is 7.8%.
The takeover probability effect is in line with the findings of Karpoff, Schon-
lau, and Wehrly (2017), who, using a different sample and a different local
instrument, also find a deterrent effect of ATPs . This consistency between
two different causal approaches contrasts with the largely inconclusive prior
literature that does not address the endogeneity of adoption.4
The positive premium effect is in contrast to the accepted wisdom that ATPs
allow managers to obtain higher premiums; we find the opposite to be true in
our sample, where there appears to be no trade-off between price and probabil-
ity. This is all the more important given that studies of the correlation between
ATPs and takeover premiums often find that adopting an ATP has a negligi-
ble or positive effect on the premium (Comment and Schwert (1995), Bange
and Mazzeo (2004), Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002), Bates, Becher,
and Lemmon (2008), Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997)). However, no prior
analysis has addressed both the endogeneity of adoption and the selection of
targets as we do here.
We next investigate the determinants of the positive premium result (of
dropping a provision), which challenges the argument that ATPs give man-
agers bargaining power to extract a higher premium. We find that across spec-
ifications, total shareholder value creation (adding up the dollar value of the
acquirer and target premiums) is positive. This net value creation seems to
come in part from more acquisitions in related industries (with higher poten-
tial for synergies) and in part from targets being matched to more valuable
acquirers (positive selection).
Across the full sample of firms, the higher premium is also linked to more
competition for less protected firms: they have more bidders, more unsolicited
bids, more challenged deals, and more deals paid in cash. The competition
among bidders increases the overall bargaining power of the target and seems
to trump any loss in bilateral bargaining power with each individual bidder.
This is consistent with the auction literature that suggests that the surplus of
4 For example, Pound (1987) documents that ATPs reduce the probability of a takeover bid, and
Ryngaert (1988) finds that firms with a poison pill are more likely to reject a hostile takeover
bid. In contrast, Comment and Schwert (1995) find that poison pills have no effect on takeovers,
and Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008) find that having a staggered board does not preclude the
completion of a takeover once a firm has already received a bid, though it may reduce the likelihood
of receiving a bid in the first place.
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the seller is determined largely by the number of bidders rather than the indi-
vidual bargaining power/negotiating skills of each of them (Bulow and Klem-
perer (1996)). However, for the more contested votes (around the discontinuity)
we find a decrease in competition in terms of number of acquirers and number
of contested deals and instead find some evidence of a higher acquirer pre-
mium, suggesting that for close-call deals the absence of competition allows
acquirers to capture some of the surplus generated.
In our last set of tests, we use our empirical framework to determine the
fraction of the total increase in value from removing ATPs that comes from
its different components. We find that the increase in value operates largely
via quantities: over 50% comes from the increased probability of mergers. The
premium effect is positive and potentially large. The selection effect is positive
and between a quarter and a half of overall value created when we focus on
the whole vote support. We cannot assess the direction of selection when we
focus on close-call votes, but the bounds suggest that it is potentially large.
This result confirms that accounting for selection is important to understand
how takeovers create value in the market.
In terms of the generalizability and external validity of our results, our data
include over one-third of firms in the S&P 1500 between 1994 and 2013. How-
ever, while our results apply to a significant share of firms, we cannot extrapo-
late the results—without further assumptions—to firms that are never subject
to such shareholder votes. In particular, we cannot rule out the possibility that
firms in which the premium effect is negative never hold a vote on ATPs. But
even in such a case we note that despite the proposals in our sample creating
value for all firms on average, some failed to garner strong shareholder sup-
port, and the vast majority were opposed by management. This raises ques-
tions about governance that are beyond the scope of this paper.
In Section I, we provide a framework for decomposing the unconditional pre-
mium. In Section II, we discuss the identification strategies underlying the
two specifications that we use in the analyses. In Section III, we describe the
data, and in Section IV, we present the results on unconditional premiums and
takeover probabilities. Section V reports the results on the conditional pre-
mium. In Section VI, we present our decomposition. In Section VII, we offer
potential explanations for the positive premiums. Section VIII concludes.
I. Framework: Decomposing the Unconditional Premium
A. Addressing Endogeneity and Selection
We start by developing an analytical framework for examining the effect of
ATPs on expected shareholder gains via takeover probabilities and premiums.
This framework allows us to establish the elements required for the decompo-
sition of the unconditional premium in Section I.B and to assess all possible
sources of bias that we need to address empirically.
We define the treatment dummy variable D, which takes the value of 1 if
shareholders vote to drop an ATP and 0 if they vote to keep it. Empirically,
we observe the realized premium variable Y, which equals the premium paid
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if a takeover takes place and 0 otherwise. The realized premium captures the
shareholder gains from the entire population of firms at risk of a takeover. To
understand selection issues, we define two latent variables. The first, Y*, is the
potential premium offered for a firm, which is observed only if a takeover takes
place. The second, Z*, is a measure of the latent merger propensity of a firm.
A merger happens whenever Z* > 0. We can therefore write the unconditional
premium (i.e., not conditional on whether the merger occurred) as Y = 1[Z*>0]
· Y*, where 1[.] is the indicator function.
The structure above gives rise to the classic selection model, which using
standard notation and assuming a linear structure can be written as (Heck-
man (1979), Lee (2009)):5
Y∗ = Dβ + Xµ1 +U
(
underlying premium
)
.
Z∗ = Dγ + Xµ2 +V
(
latent merger propensity
)
.
Y = 1 [Z∗ > 0] ·Y ∗ .
(
unconditional premium
)
.
The first challenge is to find a way to randomly assign the treatment dummy
D. If D is randomly assigned, then we can recover the effect of an ATP on the
unconditional premium, Y, and on the takeover probability, P:
P = Pr [Z∗ > 0|D = 1]− Pr [Z∗ > 0|D = 0] , (1a)
Y = E [Y |D = 1]− E [Y |D = 0] . (1b)
However, even with a randomly assigned D, one cannot recover β. Neverthe-
less, β is the parameter of interest to assess the effect of ATPs conditional on
a merger taking place. This parameter represents the difference in the price
paid for a specific target with or without an ATP in place.
The reason we cannot recover this causal parameter even when we have an
instrument for D is the selection of targets: the observed Y is conditional on a
merger occurring (Z* > 0), which itself is affected by treatment E[Y | D, X, Z*
> 0] = Dβ + Xµ1 + E[U | D, X, V> – Dγ –Xµ2].
Typically, existing premium studies compare premiums conditional on a
merger happening for firms with and without ATPs, which we can write as
E [Y |D = 1,X,Z∗ > 0]− E [Y |D = 0,X,Z∗ > 0]
= β + E[U |D = 1,X,V > −γ − Xµ2]− E [U |D = 0,X,V > −Xµ2] .
(2)
Equation (2) shows that even with a randomly assigned D (and if U and V
are not independent), one cannot recover the causal effect on Y* because of
5 This model can be generalized to a nonlinear structure.
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the sample selection term E[U | D = 1, X, V> –γ –Xµ2] – E[U | D = 0, X,
V> – Xµ2]. We therefore need an identification strategy that not only provides
exogenous assignment to treatment but also corrects for selection. Section II
describes how we address both of these requirements.
B. Decomposing the Unconditional Premium: Probability, Price, and Selection
Effects
Recall from equation (1b) that
Y = E [Y |D = 1] − E [Y |D = 0]
= Pr [Z∗ > 0|D = 1] ∗ E [Y |D = 1,Z∗ > 0] − Pr [Z∗ > 0|D = 0] ∗ E [Y |D = 0,Z∗ > 0] .
One can rewrite this equation, after some manipulation, as
Y = Pr [Z∗ > 0|D = 1] ∗ β (premium)
+E [Y |D = 0,Z∗ > 0] ∗P
(
probability
)
+Pr [Z∗ > 0|D = 1] ∗ {E [Y |D = 1,Z∗ > 0]− E [Y |D = 1, V > −Xµ2]} .
(
selection
)
Each of the terms in the expression represents a different effect of a pro-
vision on shareholder value. The first term measures the direct impact on
takeover premiums β (times the baseline probability of a merger for the treated
group). This is the effect on the premium conditional on a takeover taking
place, or in other words, how much more/less an acquirer would pay for a given
firm. Note that if ATPs give managers more bargaining power, then removing
them should lead to negative premiums. However, if removing them attracts
more competition for the target or induces better matching between bidder and
target, then it may lead to positive premiums. The second term captures the
change in merger probabilities (times the premium for the untreated group).
This reflects the change in the merger probability from the presence of an ATP
and the strength of the provision as an anti-takeover device. The third term is
a selection term that captures the change in the population of firms subject to
a takeover offer (reflecting the fact that ATPs change the population of firms
that become targets). For example, firms that end up being taken over may be
the weakest (strongest) firms in the economy as determined by potential value
creation, leading to negative (positive) selection.
In the remainder of the paper, we explain how we obtain each of the terms,
and we estimate the contribution of each to the overall unconditional premium,
as reported in Section V.
II. Identification Strategies
To identify the impact of an additional anti-takeover measure on the two
outcomes of interest, we can directly estimate the takeover probability P and
the unconditional takeover premiumY (as defined in equations (1a) and (1b)).
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We can then estimate conditional premiums and their determinants, which
requires that we examine how the firms that become a target are selected.
We define yft as the outcome of interest for firm f at time t, vft as the votes
in favor of a shareholder-sponsored ATP, vf* as the majority threshold for a
proposal to pass in firm f, and Dft = 1(vft ≥ vf*) as an indicator that takes
a value of 1 when a proposal passes. The term K is a constant. We can then
express the relationship of interest as
y f t = K +D f tϑ + u f t . (3)
The effect of interest is captured by the coefficient θ , while the error term
uft represents all other determinants of the outcome. However, using this ex-
pression in a regression is unlikely to give a consistent estimate θˆ because
passing a proposal that induces dropping an ATP is correlated with omitted
variables that are themselves correlated with the probability and character-
istics of a takeover, so that E(Dft, uft) = 0. In the next section, we cover two
possible approaches to address this problem.
A. Effect of ATPs on Unconditional Premiums and Merger Probabilities
In our setting, we use two different complementary approaches to calculate
the effect of an additional anti-takeover measure on the total unconditional
premium and on the probability of a merger. The first is a classic RDD. The
second is a matching model that uses the RDD setting to validate the condi-
tional independence assumption (CIA).
A.1. Classic RDD
Identification in the classic RDD setting exploits the facts that assignment
into treatment is governed by the running variable (votes) and treatment prob-
ability changes discretely around the majority threshold.6 However, the distri-
bution of other observable and unobservable firm characteristics is continu-
ous around the threshold. In an arbitrarily small interval around the majority
threshold, assignment to either side can be considered random. Therefore, a
discontinuous increase in the outcome variable around the passing threshold
can be interpreted as caused by the treatment.
To estimate this discrete change in the outcome variable, one can use the en-
tire data set, fitting flexible functional forms for the relationship between the
vote and the dependent variable in different ways. Lee and Lemieux (2010)
suggest the use of different polynomials for observations on either side of the
6 Evidence for the fact that implementation probabilities change discretely at the discontinuity
can be found in Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012, 2016), Popadak (2014), and Bach and Metzger
(2015).
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threshold.7 Alternatively, one can run a local regression on an optimally cal-
culated interval around the discontinuity, as proposed by Imbens and Kalya-
naraman (2012, IK) for a local linear regression approach, and extended by
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014, CCT) to a second-order weighted-
polynomial regression over an optimal bandwidth that balances efficiency and
bias.8
A.2. A Matching Model with Validated CIA in an RDD Setting
The downside of the classic RDD is that identification is local and comes from
firms with vote outcomes around the discontinuity. To obtain arguably causal
estimates for firms with vote outcomes away from the majority threshold, we
use a matching estimator. Following the identification strategy in Angrist and
Rokkanen (2015), we estimate a matching model in which we validate the CIA
using a test that relies only on the standard underlying assumption of RDDs,
namely, that all of the heterogeneity in the treatment comes from the running
variable.
Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) note that a unique feature of a regression dis-
continuity setting is that one observes the running variable (vft in our case),
which is the only factor that determines “treatment” (D = 1), or as they put it,
“RD design takes the mystery out of treatment assignment.” In classic match-
ing model applications (without random variation in D), researchers match
treated and control firms and assume that the set of controls that they match
on is sufficiently rich that any difference between outcomes is driven only by
treatment (D). However, unless treatment is randomly assigned, there is no
way to know whether one has the right set of matching criteria or whether
omitted variables are correlated with assignment and the outcomes.
In regression discontinuity, the running variable is the (only) assignment
variable. For example, in our setting we know that Dft = 1[ vft > vft*]. Thus,
we know the nature of the possible omitted variables bias anything that is
correlated with vft that also determines outcomes. One can therefore identify
the coefficients of interest under a CIA:
E[y f t|v f t, x f t] = E[y f t|x f t];D = 0,1.
The CIA states that potential outcomes are mean-independent of the run-
ning variable, conditional on a set of controls xft. If the CIA holds, then the
model is identified.
In standard matching models, the CIA is implicit but never tested because
the assignment process is not observed. But the RDD setting gives us the
7 If votes are stochastic, the estimator can be interpreted as a weighted average treatment effect
that uses all observations, with weights directly proportional to the probability of each firm having
a realized vote near the discontinuity (Lee and Lemieux (2010)).
8 The weights are computed by applying a kernel function on the distance of each observation’s
score to the cutoff. We then estimate θ as the difference between these nonparametric regression
functions on either side of the majority threshold.
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running variable, which allows us to test the CIA outside the discontinuity.9
In practice, testing the CIA amounts to making sure that while there may be a
significant relationship between yft and vft, the two are mean-independent con-
ditional on xft. This can be tested by showing that they are mean-independent
outside the discontinuity threshold.
In other words, the RDD provides a diagnostic tool to test the validity of
the model that is used in a matching estimator. In this sense, the proposed
estimator is formally very different from an RDD, but uses the RDD setting to
validate the set of variables that participate in the model. This approach stems
from the assumption that the only source of heterogeneity in assignment is the
vote and relies on an auxiliary regression to test it.
Ideally one wants the CIA to hold in the full support of the running vari-
able.10 However, this may not be feasible in some cases. In such circumstances,
some researchers have proposed limiting the sample to some interval from the
threshold over which CIA holds (this is referred to as Bounded CIA in the
NBER working paper version of Angrist Rokkanen (2015) and is used, for ex-
ample, in Hainmueller, Hall, and Snyder. (2015)).11
Imposing this additional structure has several advantages. First, this strat-
egy allows us to estimate a matching model using the full sample and test
the CIA that underlies identification. This means we can provide estimates for
firms with vote outcomes away from the discontinuity while retaining a causal
interpretation.12 Moreover, using our estimates we can build counterfactuals
at each vote level that predict what would have happened had that firm voted
differently. This implies that we can assess whether there are heterogeneous
9 A further condition required in this identification strategy is the existence of common support,
so that the treatment status (removing an ATP) retains meaningful variation after we condition
on X.
10 In Angrist Rokkanen (2015), the full-sample CIA is estimated in the ±20 interval for each
school because this is the interval over which the samples are “clean” in the sense that the coun-
terfactuals are clear—it avoids a situation whereby a student in the “accepted” sample of the
less selective school (O’Bryant) would also be accepted into the more selective school (BLS) where
someone not accepted is to BLS would have been below the O’Bryant threshold for acceptance.
11 The tension between these two strategies is that, on the one hand, it is preferable not to select
the interval based on postestimation results (this favors testing for the CIA on the full support
only), while on the other hand, testing the CIA on smaller subsamples (because it is less likely
to be satisfied as we move away from the discontinuity) provides a gradual sense of the extent to
which the CIA is satisfied (this is the Bounded CIA strategy).
12 Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) also show how to extend this to the fuzzy RDD. Note that
throughout the paper, since we do not have information on implementation, we present reduced-
form estimates of the intent to treat. One can estimate the impact of implementation by rescaling
the intent to treat estimator. The rescaling factor is one over the change in the probability of
implementation when a proposal passes. This conversion factor when estimated over the whole
vote support ranges between 1.2 (using estimates from Popadak (2014), who finds that the differ-
ence in implementation between pass and fail is 84%) and 1.7 (using estimates from Bach and
Metzger (2015), who find that average implementation conditional on passing is 59%). Note also
that one does not need CIA on implementation to hold to interpret our estimates as causal ITT
estimates—the CIA test already takes into account any heterogeneity in implementation on the
outcome variables.
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effects of ATPs for different levels of vote support. Overall, this approach al-
lows us to test the validity of the matching in a theoretically sound way, subject
only to the limitations of applying an asymptotic result to a finite sample. The
limit to interpreting results using this identification strategy as causal is the
extent to which the CIA is satisfied. We discuss this further below. See section
3 in Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) for a related discussion.
B. Estimating the Conditional Premium using Bounds
The existing literature focuses on the effect of ATPs on the takeover pre-
mium conditional on a merger happening. However, as noted in Section I, a re-
maining challenge is to disentangle which part of this effect is a causal effect,
fixing the characteristics of the target firm (e.g., effects that arise from changes
in bargaining power, matching with different bidders, changes in competition
for target firms, etc.), and which part of the effect is due to selection (i.e., when
ATPs are dropped, a different population of firms experience takeovers).
This is a form of selection that is inherent to the problem studied rather than
a sampling issue. To correct it, we could have an excluded variable in a Heck-
man selection model, but these are virtually impossible to find in this setting
since any variable that predicts takeovers will also determine the premium.
The alternative is to provide bounds for the parameters of interest.
Lee (2009) shows how to use the structure of the underlying model to re-
cover upper and lower bounds for β. If one observes E[Y | D = 1, X, V> – Xµ2],
which is the premium from the sample of firms that would have merged even
without the ATP but that actually removed it, then one could estimate β from
E[Y | D = 1, X, V> – Xµ2] – E[Y | D = 0, X, V> – Xµ2]. However, this is never
observed. But notice that the sample for which V> – Xµ2 is included in V> –γ
–Xµ2. This gives us a strategy to provide an upper (lower) bound for β under a
monotonicity assumption: if one considers that all counterfactual observations
for which we do not see Y are drawn from the lower (upper) end of the Y dis-
tribution, we can obtain a lower (upper) bound for β by trimming a proportion
p (1 – p) from the observations for Y, where p = Pr(–γ –Xµ2<V←Xµ2)/Pr(–γ
–Xµ2<V) . In what follows, we call these “sharp Lee bounds” (Lee (2009)).
Note that to apply Lee (2009) bounds we need an empirical distribution of
the conditional premium, so it is not possible to estimate bounds at the discon-
tinuity without making additional assumptions. One possibility is to assume
that the distribution of premiums on an interval around the discontinuity is
a good approximation for the distribution at the discontinuity. One needs to
achieve a compromise between a narrow interval (e.g., 10 percentage points
around the discontinuity) that brings the results closer to a causal interpreta-
tion or a broader interval that produces a more meaningful distribution and
increases the power of the test. We use this approach when we decompose
the unconditional premium into its components in an interval around the dis-
continuity. Alternatively, we can extend the results beyond the discontinuity
using the CIA-validated matching so we can implement the bounding strategy
on the population distribution of premiums using all available observations
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adequately weighted. Under the CIA, this approach produces results that can
be interpreted as causal and that contain the whole distribution of premiums.
Our study thus adds value by combining these various techniques for different
subsamples and each with its own maintained assumptions to show similar
results.
III. Data Description and Sample Characteristics
We construct a data set that spans 20 years of voting data from ISS-
Riskmetrics (ISS-Shareholder Proposals database).13 These data contain in-
formation on all of the proposals voted on in the S&P 1500 universe and an
additional 500 widely held firms. We restrict the analysis to the set of ATPs
that make up the G-index as defined by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).
Our main sample consists of 2,881 shareholder-sponsored proposals voted on
at annual meetings to change the anti-takeover structure of the firm.
Based on this sample, we construct two different vote metrics. The first is
Simple Vote Rule, which is computed as Votes For/(Votes For + Votes Against)
whenever the pass rule is defined over votes cast. The second metric, Vote Ad-
justed for Abstentions, starts from the simple majority vote rule and computes
Votes For/(Votes For+Votes Against+Abstentions) in those cases in which the
firm or state rules determine that the cast votes include abstentions. In both
cases we use Votes For/(Shares Outstanding) whenever the pass rule is defined
over votes outstanding. To gather information about how votes are computed,
we fully merge the ISS-Shareholder Proposals database with the ISS-Voting
Results database for the period 1997 to 2006. We also merge it with Voting
Analytics for the 2007 to 2013 period; we are able to match around half of
our observations in that period. Unfortunately, within our universe there is
no reliable information about the treatment of abstentions for observations
before 1997 and for the unmatched observations after 2006.14 The advantage
of Simple Vote Rule is that it is consistently defined across all observations
and is comparable with previous studies that use the ISS-Shareholder Pro-
posals data set. The simple majority rule is also very focal and used by ISS,
investors, and the SEC to justify their rules and voting recommendations. The
advantage of Vote Adjusted for Abstentions is that it is closer to what managers
publicly report as the vote outcome and hence is more directly determinant for
implementation. The disadvantage is that the inclusion of abstentions and bro-
ker nonvotes may make this measure easier to manipulate. Bach and Metzger
13 For the period 1997 to 2013, we use the ISS-Shareholder Proposals data set, formerly known
as Riskmetrics, and now part of ISS. For the period 1994 to 1996, we use data from ISS tapes. We
would like to thank Ernst Maug and Kristian Rydqvist for providing us with these data (Maug
and Rydqvist (2009)).
14 This translates into not knowing the exact treatment of abstentions for one-third of the
sample. On average, two-thirds of the firms use the simple majority rule, so we expect that for
one-ninth of the Adjusted Vote observations we use the simple rule even though we should have
accounted for abstentions. The difference between the two vote criterions is small: on average ab-
stentions represent 1.3% of the votes, and out of 1,851 observations for which we know the exact
voting rule using the alternative data set, only 30 observations change from pass to no pass.
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(2019) argue that there is manipulation using the Adjusted Vote metric in the
Voting Analytics data set. As we show below, we find no evidence of manipu-
lation in our sample with either metric. Throughout the paper, we use Simple
Vote Rule as our main specification, but we report our main results for both
rules and show they are very similar across measures.15
To obtain our treatment indicator (D), we use information on vote outcomes
adjusted by majority rules (simple majority – supermajority) and votes base
(votes cast or outstanding). If this information is not available, we use a simple
majority rule of 50% of votes cast. We define the distance to the vote as the
difference between the vote outcome and the majority threshold (vft – vf*).
We match this sample of firms to the SDC platinum database to identify
which firms were taken over following a vote. We consider whether a firm is
taken over within five years of the vote if at least 50% of its ownership is ac-
quired by a bidder. For firms with multiple votes we treat these as separate
events, but we cluster standard errors by firm in our estimates.16 In most of
our analysis, we define the merger premium for firms that are taken over as
the cumulative return from four weeks prior to the takeover announcement up
to the completion date (as reported by SDC), which, as we show below, gives the
most conservative estimates of our effect when in robustness tests we compare
it to a range of alternative measures (see Table V). We also obtain information
from SDC on the acquirer’s premium (available only for listed acquirers), the
number of bidders, the number of unsolicited bids, whether the deal was chal-
lenged, the percentage that was paid in stock, and whether both firms belong to
the same two-digit SIC industry. Financial information comes from Compustat
and ownership information from Thomson 13F.
Table IA.I in the Internet Appendix presents information on the evolution of
the votes to remove an ATP used in the paper, as well as the takeover probabil-
ities and premium over time. The average probability of a firm experiencing a
takeover over the five years following a shareholder vote is 14%. We have a to-
tal of 138 (81) targets within 10 (5) percentage points of the majority threshold.
The mean conditional premium (the premium paid conditional on a successful
merger) is 32.7% and the mean unconditional premium (which assigns zero
premium to the unsuccessful mergers) is 4.83%.17
Table I presents basic descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample. To
assess how firms subject to a shareholder proposal differ from their sampling
15We also report all of the specification tests and postestimation calculations for Vote Adjusted
for Abstentions in the Internet Appendix, which is available in the online version of the article on
The Journal of Finance website.
16 In an earlier version, we analyzed whether there were differential effects for firms that voted
on an issue the first time, second time, third time, etc. We found no significant differences, so we
decided to pool the effects.
17Note that throughout the paper, we treat all ATPs as if they were identical, although in real-
ity they may not be. Table IA.IV in the Internet Appendix shows that the most frequent provisions,
which play a major role in identifying the effect, are: repeal classified board (35%), adopt cumu-
lative voting (16%), and repeal poison pill (14%). Given that there is not enough power at the
provision-type level to identify the separate effects of each proposal type within our methodology,
we run our analysis for all G-index proposals pooled—a common measure of ATPs.
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Table I
Descriptive Statistics
This table describes the sample of 2,882 voted G-index proposals one period before the vote. All accounting variables are obtained from Compus-
tat: Market Value (mkvalt_f), Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the book value of assets (AT), bal-
ance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC), Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), Return on Assets (NI/AT), Profit Margin
(EBITDA/Sale), Liquidity (CHE/Sales), Leverage ((DLTT+DLC)/AT), Capital Expenditures (Capx/AT), and Overhead (XSGA/XOPR). Ownership vari-
ables are generated from Thomson 13F database. All monetary values are in 2012 US$. Note that the number of observations may change due to
missing values for some of the variables.
N Mean Median SD 10th Percentile 90th Percentile Mean SP1500 t-Test
Market Value ($million) 2860 28,928 9,476 58,068 595 73,761 9,561 15.4
Tobin’s Q 2755 1.58 1.25 0.98 0.95 2.59 1.96 −14.8
Return on Equity 2863 0.153 0.107 0.220 −0.070 0.292 −0.04 1.25
Return on Assets 2861 0.031 0.031 0.087 −0.023 0.109 0.12 −7.4
Profit Margin (EBITDA/Sales) 2805 0.159 0.169 0.167 0.055 0.385 0.13 0.3
Cash Liquidity (CHE/Sales) 2861 0.091 0.052 0.109 0.006 0.221 0.13 −17.8
Leverage (DLTT+DLC)/AT 2859 0.288 0.277 0.165 0.078 0.505 0.223 18.5
Capital Expenditures (Capx/AT) 2744 0.053 0.043 0.048 0.003 0.109 0.052 0.12
Overheads (SGA/Op.Exp.) 2175 0.282 0.251 0.184 0.077 0.521 0.314 −5.79
Ownership Inst. Shareholders 2696 0.638 0.655 0.193 0.378 0.864 0.680 −4.85
Ownership Herfindahl 2698 0.054 0.041 0.054 0.022 0.089 0.063 −7.61
Vote Simple rule 2882 48.14 47.03 21.83 20 78.1 n.a. n.a.
Vote Adjusted for Abstentions 2882 47.80 46.7 21.56 20 77.8 n.a. n.a.
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population, we present the characteristics of the average S&P 1500 firms and
compare them to firms in our sample. One of the most noticeable differences
is that firms in our sample are three times larger than the average S&P 1500
firm. In addition, firms in the voting sample have lower Tobin’s Q, a slightly
higher leverage ratio, and relatively less cash liquidity. However, they are not
that different in terms of profitability, return on equity, cash flows, capital ex-
penditures, and overhead. This suggest that while we obtain results for all
firms subject to an anti-takeover removal proposal (roughly one-third of the
population of S&P 1500 firms), one should exercise caution in extrapolating
the results to firms that have never had such a shareholder proposal. In other
words, as with any identification strategy, we cannot extrapolate the results
outside the sample without making further assumptions.
IV. The Effect of ATPs on Takeover Probability and Unconditional
Premiums
A. RDD Estimates of Unconditional Premiums and Takeover Probabilities
A.1. Preliminary Tests to Validate the RDD Identification Strategy
Before presenting results using the classic RDD and the validated matching
model, we need to run a series of tests to confirm that the setting of interest is
appropriate for using these methods. First, we show there are no pre-existing
differences in firm characteristics (or trends in firm characteristics) around
the majority threshold, which is an assumption of the RDD (Table IA.II in the
Internet Appendix).
Second, we show that the distribution of the frequency of votes is continuous
around the discontinuity. A discrete and significant jump in density to either
side of the discontinuity would be indicative of strategic behavior around the
majority threshold, such that the continuity assumption would be violated.
This does not appear to be true in our data, and we believe the main differ-
ences with respect to Bach and Metzger (2019) arise from the limited overlap
between the two samples—only 16% of observations are common, due to dif-
ferent proposal coverage, years, and sampling (See the Internet Appendix for
more details on differences between the samples).18 In fact, Figure IA.1, Panel
A, in the Internet Appendix shows a smooth overall distribution of votes for
the simple vote. Figure IA.1, Panel B, in the Internet Appendix shows that the
formal continuity test proposed by McCrary (2008) rejects the discontinuity
18 There are important sample differences with respect to Bach and Metzger (2019): we focus
on G-index proposals for S&P 1500 firms, their main sample focuses on a broader set of proposals
of the Russell 3000 index that only includes 16% of takeover-related proposals; they also focus
on a different time period. When Bach and Metzger (2019) use ISS data for 2003 to 2011, they
focus on the 10 proposals with most favorable votes. Only six of them belong to the G-index. They
also have incomplete sampling due to missing information. The fraction of observations in our
sample present in their sample ranges from 9% to 25% depending on subsamples. SectionIII in
the Internet Appendix describes the main differences between these two databases for our time
period.
16 The Journal of Finance®
Panel A. Merger Probability Panel B. Unconditional Premium
5
y
r 
M
e
rg
e
r 
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
.2
5
.2
.1
5
.1
.0
5
-40 -20 0
0
2
4
U
n
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
P
re
m
iu
m
6
8
1
0
% votes above pass
20 40 -40 -20 0
% votes above pass
20 40
Figure 1. Unconditional merger probability and premium. Linear regression using the Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) approach to select the bandwidth. Dots represent the simple means by
bins of 2% vote intervals. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] (Color figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
of the density function at the majority threshold. Figure IA.1, Panel C, in the
Internet Appendix plots results of the discontinuity test for the adjusted vote
and shows no statistical difference at the threshold (note that, visually, there
is a small discrete change, but this does not resemble in any way the large
discontinuity documented by Bach and Metzger (2019; Figure 1). We also test
for discontinuity in the votes for subperiods and by proposal using both vote
definitions, and find no evidence of manipulation in any subsample (see Table
IA.V, Panel A and B, in the Internet Appendix). These tests confirm that our
data set represents a good setting in which to apply the classic RDD using both
vote definitions.
A.2. Results using the RDD
We now present estimates of the effect of passing a proposal to remove an
ATP on the takeover probability and the expected premium using the RDD.
We begin by presenting graphical evidence using all of our data. Figure 1,
Panel A, shows the relationship between the merger probability and the dis-
tance from the majority threshold (percentage of votes above pass in the hori-
zontal axis) for Simple Vote Rule. The dots represent simple means in bins of
2% vote intervals, and the solid line is a running linear regression using the
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) approach to select the bandwidth. Overall,
the downward-sloping line suggests that higher shareholder support for drop-
ping ATPs is associated with a lower likelihood of a takeover. On the basis of
this evidence alone we would wrongly conclude from the correlation that the
more likely firms are to drop ATPs, the less likely they are to be taken over.
However, this is driven by unobserved characteristics. In fact, at the major-
ity threshold we see a discrete change upward in the function, suggesting a
positive causal effect of voting to drop the provision on the takeover probabil-
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ity. The size of this discrete change is the regression discontinuity estimate,
that is, the local causal effect of the vote outcome.
Figure 1, Panel B, shows the same graph with the unconditional premium in
the vertical axis. We again observe a negative overall relationship between the
two variables but a clear positive change at the discontinuity, suggesting that
voting to drop an ATP increases the unconditional premium that firms expect
to receive.19
Table II presents regression estimates of the effect at the discontinuity seen
in Figure 1, Panels A and B, using four different estimation methods. Columns
(1) to (4) report results for the nonparametric test, which is a means test of
the outcome variable, calculated on an increasingly narrow interval of votes
around the majority threshold. Columns (5) and (6) report the regression dis-
continuity estimates using polynomial controls of order two and three (respec-
tively) to each side of the discontinuity. Columns (7) and (8) report results of
running local regressions on an optimal bandwidth around the discontinuity.
In particular, column (7) reports the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) local
regression estimate, and column (8) reports the Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiu-
nik (2014) estimate. Columns (9) to (12) replicate the specifications of columns
(5) to (8) using Vote Adjusted for Abstentions.
Panel A reports results for the probability of a takeover within five years of
a shareholder vote. The results show no effect on average of passing a proposal
when all observations are included (column (1)). The differential probability
of experiencing a takeover within five years of the vote is 4.76% in the 10%
interval and between 7.7% and 9.6% in the narrower intervals.20 Using the
specifications in columns (5) to (8), this effect ranges from 8.7% to 11.7%. The
results when using Vote Adjusted for Abstentions in columns (9) to (12) are
very similar with estimates ranging from 7% to 9.2%. These effects are size-
able when compared with the sample-wide average five-year probability of a
takeover of 14%.
In Panel B of Table II, we explore the effects of ATPs on the unconditional ex-
pected premium received by shareholders in subsequent takeover transactions
over five years. We focus on unconditional premiums (we assign zero premium
to firms that do not undergo a merger within five years).
The results in columns (1) to (4) of Table II, Panel B, report results for the
fully nonparametric means comparison approach. The effect of dropping an
ATP is an increase in the expected premium of between 2.6% (in the 10% in-
terval) and 4.3% (closer to the threshold). Columns (6) and (7), which use the
flexible polynomial approach, show expected premiums of about 5%. The local
regression approach produces slightly smaller estimates of 4.1% and 3.6% (IK
and CCT). The results with Vote Adjusted for Abstentions in columns (9) to (12)
19 The graphs are very similar when using Vote Adjusted for Abstentions. See Figure IA.3, Pan-
els A and B, in the Internet Appendix.
20 A possible explanation for the difference in the size of the effects is that the estimation of θ
in a broad interval is biased due to the endogenous adoption of proposals. For example, if firms
with a lower ex ante likelihood of receiving an offer are more likely to drop ATPs, a sample-wide
estimate like that in column (1) would be biased downward.
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Table II
Takeover Probability and Premiums around the Majority Threshold
This table presents the effect of passing an anti-takeover proposal on the probability of becoming a target and on premiums. Panel A displays the
probability of becoming a target, which is estimated over the next five years after the vote using SDC data. Panel B displays the unconditional
premium of becoming a potential target. Premiums are computed as the price offer to target four weeks prior to announcement until completion.
Column (1) estimates are based on the full sample. Column (2) restricts the sample to observations with a vote share within 10 points of the threshold,
column (3) to five points, and so forth. Column (5) and (6) introduce a polynomial in the vote share of order two and three (Lee and Lemieux (2010)),
one on each side of the threshold, and use the full sample. Column (7) uses the local linear regression approach by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
with a triangular kernel function. Column (8) uses the nonparametric approach proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). Columns (9)
to (12) are estimated using an alternative vote measure that adjusts for abstentions. All columns control for year fixed effects; standard errors are
clustered by firm. The reported bandwidth is expressed in percentage vote. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***,
respectively.
Simple Vote Rule Vote Adjusted for Abstentions
Full ±10 ±5 ±2.5
Polynomial
2
Polynomial
3 IK CCT
Polynomial
2
Polynomial
3 IK CCT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Probability of Becoming a Takeover Target over the Next Five Years
Yes simple −1.24% 4.76% 7.71%** 9.60%* 8.80%** 11.7%** 9.18%*** 8.69%** 9.23%** 9.01%* 8.08%** 7.03%*
(2.11) (3.26) (3.81) (5.34) (4.25) (5.11) (3.11) (4.25) (4.34) (5.18) (3.39) (4.72)
Bandwidth 27.7 13.2 23.3 13.5
Observations 2,881 883 457 249 2,881 2,881 2,882 2,882 2,881 2,881 2882 2882
R2/Z 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.015 0.006 0.007 2.95 2.05 0.005 0.006 2.38 1.65
Panel B: Unconditional Premium, Four Weeks
Yes simple 0.194 2.616** 3.012* 4.321 5.327*** 5.243** 4.12*** 3.59* 5.02*** 3.48 3.27** 2.66
(0.794) (1.212) (1.707) (2.662) (1.711) (2.251) (1.52) (2.02) (1.746) (2.294) (1.60) (2.09)
Bandwidth 24.6 14.3 22.6 13.8
Observations 2,881 883 457 249 2,881 2,881 2,882 2,882 2,881 2,881 2,882 2,882
R2/Z 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.013 0.035 0.036 2.69 1.76 0.035 0.036 2.04 1.27
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are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, although in column (12) the result
is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Again, these effects are substan-
tial against an average unconditional premium of 4.8% in the sample as shown
in Table IA.I, Panel B, in the Internet Appendix.
The estimates are by construction local and since they are quite large
it is natural to wonder whether they extrapolate to the rest of the sam-
ple. It is possible, for instance, that the very large estimates apply only
to firms with close-call votes. To address this question, in the next sec-
tion, we employ a validated matching model as a complementary estimation
approach.
B. Estimating Unconditional Premiums and Takeover Probabilities using a
Validated Matching Model
B.1. Testing the CIA and Preliminary Results
As described in Section II, the RDD setting is an ideal setting to test the CIA
that underlies any matching model. This is what we do in Table III.
More specifically, in Table III we test whether conditioning on an explicit
model for the determinants of takeover allows us to eliminate the relationship
between the running variable (the vote) and the outcome variables (takeover
probability and unconditional premium) at each side of the discontinuity. To
satisfy the CIA, in the remainder of the paper we use a model that includes as
regressors natural variables capturing the takeover probability and premium.
These are firm size and performance the year before the vote (in terms of sales,
market value, profit margin, cash liquidity), firm governance the year before
the vote (percentage of equity controlled by institutional owners and E-index),
measures related to market performance the year before the vote (average To-
bin’s Q of the industry and average market value of the industry), and year
dummies.
Columns (1) and (3) ((5) and (7)) of Table III show that the correlation be-
tween the vote and the takeover probability (unconditional premium) on either
side of the threshold (D= 0 andD= 1) is negative and in most instances highly
significant. The effect is also rather large in most cases. For example, the coeffi-
cient in column (1) implies that a 10% increase in the vote outcome reduces the
takeover probability by 2.51 percentage points (from a mean takeover proba-
bility of 14%). This result reflects the fact that the vote outcome and our depen-
dent variables are highly correlated. However, once we condition on our model
(even-numbered columns of Table III), the point estimates drop by a full order
of magnitude, getting closer to zero, and the correlation becomes statistically
insignificant. For example, the 2.51 percentage point effect in column (1) drops
to 0.12 percentage points in column (2) (and is highly insignificant, with stan-
dard errors of a similar magnitude as in column (1)). This result shows that the
outcomes and the vote are mean-independent conditional on a number of vari-
ables, which supports the assumption that vote and takeover probability are
20
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Table III
Conditional Independence Tests
This table reports results on the conditional independence assumption for our two outcome variables: Takeover Probability and Unconditional Pre-
mium. Columns (1), (3), (5), and 7 present evidence on the initial relationship between the running variable (i.e., the vote) and the two outcome
variables for observations to the left or right of the cutoff. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) present evidence for the model that controls for firm char-
acteristics one year prior to the vote, where controls include ln Sales, Profit Margin, ln Market Value, Cash Liquidity, Percentage of Institutional
Ownership, Average Industry Tobin’s Q, Average Industry Market Value, and the Entrenchment Index. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Simple Vote Rule
Takeover Probability Unconditional Premium
D = 0 D = 1 D = 0 D = 1
[−50,0) [0,50] [−50,0) [0,50]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vote −0.00251*** −0.000127 −0.00160* −0.000470 −0.0825*** −0.0417 −0.0249 −0.0400
(0.000848) (0.000878) (0.000838) (0.000951) (0.0313) (0.0300) (0.0348) (0.0439)
ln Sales −0.0135 −0.0261* −1.446*** −0.654
(0.0146) (0.0147) (0.500) (0.677)
Profit Margin 0.235*** 0.00846 −0.536 0.210
(0.0748) (0.0807) (2.560) (3.723)
ln Market Value −0.0173 −0.0149 0.190 −1.102*
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.468) (0.638)
Cash Liquidity 0.110 0.192* 0.721 7.674*
(0.104) (0.0984) (3.543) (4.540)
Inst. Own. 0.0241 −0.183** 4.103* −11.89***
(0.0634) (0.0796) (2.168) (3.674)
Av. Ind. Tobin’s Q 0.00581 0.0163 0.274 1.116**
(0.0109) (0.0105) (0.373) (0.486)
Av. Ind. Mkt. Value 0.0699*** 0.0249* 1.337*** 0.321
(0.0113) (0.0128) (0.387) (0.590)
Entrench. Index 0.0156** 0.0135 0.446 1.187**
(0.00793) (0.0100) (0.271) (0.463)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,095 1,095 1,284 1,283 1,095 1,095
R2 0.007 0.139 0.003 0.089 0.005 0.094 0.000 0.085
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Panel A. Conditional Independence Test –
Merger Probability
Panel B. Conditional Independence Test - Premiums
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Figure 2. Conditional independence (CIA) tests. Residuals of two independent linear models
(one to each side of the discontinuity) using the same covariates as in the matching model.
Dots represent the simple means by bins of 2% vote intervals. [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com] (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
conditionally independent in the D = 0 (votes did not pass) region.21 Column
(4) shows that vote and takeover probability are also conditionally indepen-
dent in the D = 1 (votes passed) region. A similar pattern emerges for the un-
conditional premium in columns (5) (large, significant effect) and (6) (smaller,
insignificant effect). In columns (7) and (8), for D = 1 there is no significant
relationship between the unconditional premium and vote (column (7)), and
the coefficient continues to be insignificant in column (8). Table IA.IX in the
Internet Appendix reports similar results for the adjusted votes measure.
Complementing the formal CIA analysis, in Figure 2 we plot the residuals
of regressions that include the covariates in Table III excluding shareholder
votes. In particular, Figure 2 plots firm outcomes (takeover probability in Panel
A and unconditional premium in Panel B) against the residuals obtained from
regressing the outcomes on our model, on each side of the threshold. The figure
plots the residual means in 2% bins and uses local linear regression estima-
tion of the outcome variables as a function of the vote. If the CIA holds after
we condition on our model, the remaining relationship between firm outcomes
(takeover probability or premium) and the vote outcome should be relatively
flat. We see that the estimated relationship is indeed statistically flat on both
sides of the threshold for both variables (and within the confidence bands),
indicating that the model does a good job making the running variable uncor-
related with potential outcomes along the vote support. The same is true for
the adjusted vote measure as can be seen in Figure IA.4, Panels A and B, in
the Internet Appendix.
21Note that the R2 in odd-numbered columns is low, meaning that factors other than the vote
outcome help explain whether a firm is taken over, but what is important for this test is that those
other factors are not omitted variables in our regressions that would determine assignment (i.e.,
correlated with outcomes and the vote).
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Having made the running variable, which determines assignment to treat-
ment, conditionally independent of outcomes, we move on to using matching
methods to compare treated and control groups. We first test whether the cal-
culated propensity scores for treatment and control groups pass the common
support test. The logit model for the propensity score is calculated using the
same model as in the CIA tests. (See the common support test in Figure IA.2 in
the Internet Appendix. The formal balancing test (Dehejia and Wahba (1999))
also shows that the covariates are balanced).
B.2. Results using the CIA-Validated Matching Model
After testing for the CIA and establishing that we have common support, we
can match firms on either side of the discontinuity based on our model. First,
as in Angrist and Rokkanen (2015), we use the estimated propensity score (see
Table IA.VI in the Internet Appendix) to provide a propensity-score-weighted
matching estimator of the effect of passing a shareholder-sponsored proposal
to remove an ATP. This amounts to weighting treated observations (D = 1)
by 1/p and control observations (D = 0) by 1/(1-p), where p is the propensity
score estimated using our model. We also add to the reweighted regression the
variables included in the CIA model as controls to reinforce the matching pro-
cedure. The results are reported in Table IV, Panel A. For Simple Vote Rule we
find that passing an ATP leads to a 4.1% increase in the probability of takeover
(column (1)) and a 2.6% increase in the unconditional premium (column (2)).
The analogous results for Vote Adjusted for Abstentions are 3.6% and 2.3%,
respectively.
We also obtain similar results if we use a different matching estimator, such
as the nearest-neighbor matching estimator with replacement (Table IV, Panel
B), which delivers a 3.4% increase in takeover probability and a 2.5% increase
in the unconditional premium. The results for Vote Adjusted for Abstentions
are virtually unchanged, with estimates of 3.25% and 2.4%, respectively.
Note that, in general, while the adjustment for the treatment of abstentions
is small, it can still affect the RDD estimates, which are based largely on the
observations near the majority threshold.22 However, this adjustment has al-
most no effect on the estimators based on matching that rely on the full set of
available observations.
Three results are noteworthy here. First, confirming what we find when com-
paring results at the 10% interval relative to those at the discontinuity, the
estimates away from the discontinuity are smaller than the discontinuity esti-
mates, suggesting that firms around the discontinuity (with contentious votes)
stand to benefit more from removing ATPs than firms away from the discon-
tinuity, on average.23 Second, the results away from the discontinuity are still
22Within our sample, abstentions account for an average of 4.8% of the votes (median 2.5%) for
those observations for which we have full information about them.
23Unfortunately, one cannot apply this estimation strategy to cumulative abnormal re-
turns (CARs) on the day of the vote itself. This is because, while the CAR for firms at the
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Table IV
Matching Estimates of the Unconditional Premium in the Full
Sample
This table reports CIA estimates of the effect of passing a G-index proposal on the takeover prob-
ability and the unconditional premium (four weeks before announcement to completion). Panel A
reports results from a linear reweighting estimator and Panel B reports results from a nearest-
neighbor matching procedure with replacement and two matches per observation. Controls are the
same as in Table III: ln Sales, Profit Margin, ln Market Value, Cash Liquidity, Percentage of Insti-
tutional Ownership, Average Industry Tobin’s Q, Average Industry Market Value, and Entrench-
ment Index. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Simple Vote Rule Vote Adjusted for Abstentions
Takeover
Probability
Unconditional
Premium
Takeover
Probability
Unconditional
Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Propensity Score Weighting
Yes 4.1%** 2.59*** 3.62%* 2.34**
(1.97) (0.97) (1.9) (1.00)
t-Statistic 2.05 2.66 1.83 2.33
Model Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,123 2,123 2,129 2,129
Panel B: Nearest-Neighbor Matching
Yes 3.36%* 2.53*** 3.25%* 2.39***
(1.92) (0.81) (1.92) (0.80)
t-Statistic 1.74 3.10 1.69 2.98
Observations 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
positive, significant, and economically large. The mean takeover probability
(over five years) in this sample is 14%, and voting to remove an ATP increases
that probability by 4.1 percentage points. Correspondingly, the mean uncon-
ditional takeover premium is 4.8%, and voting to remove an ATP increases
the premium by 2.6 percentage points. Third, these matching estimates can
be interpreted as causal for a broad set of firms under stronger identification
assumptions than the RDD assumptions. Although our sample does not com-
prise the full set of listed firms in the United States, it represents a substantial
share of the S&P 1500 index (931 distinct firms). See Section II in the Internet
Appendix for further discussion and tests of heterogeneous effects along the
voting support.24
discontinuity is the surprise outcome that reveals information (thus reflecting the full value of
the vote, which the paper estimates), returns away from the discontinuity are likely expected by
the market and therefore contain no information on the vote (see section 1B in Cuñat, Gine, and
Guadalupe (2012)).
24 As additional robustness checks, we evaluate whether these effects are the result of voting
on any proposal—rather than of voting to remove an ATP. In Table IA.VII, Panels A and B, in the
Internet Appendix, we replicate the analysis in Tables II and III using other (non-antitakeover)
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Before moving on to analyze conditional premiums, it is worth noting that
our estimates capture the effect of voting to remove the provision, but since
votes are not binding (the decision as to whether to follow shareholders’ rec-
ommendation is left to managers), they are estimated on the basis of those
firms that implemented the proposal because it passed and that would not
have implemented it otherwise. In other words, these are ITT effects. To ob-
tain the effect of treatment on the treated (the effect on outcomes that operates
through the actual removal of the provision), they need to be re-scaled by the
inverse of the change in the probability of removing the provision following a
positive vote. Although we cannot estimate these conversion factors directly
from our data, we can approximate them using the reported implementation
differentials from the pre-existing literature. This would imply multiplying the
regression discontinuity results by a factor of three and the matching results
by a factor between 1.2 and 1.7 to obtain a Wald estimate of the treatment on
the treated.25
Finally, we find that these effects emerge only when voting to remove ATP.
Voting to drop other types of provisions has no effect on takeover probabili-
ties or premiums, which suggests the results are not related to “voting” per se
but more specifically to the takeover channel (see Table IA.VII in the Internet
Appendix).
V. Effect on the Conditional Premium
In Section IV, we obtain causal estimates for the effect of treatment on
the unconditional premium Y and the takeover probability P. However, we
would also like to recover the effect on the premium itself, β, that is, the ex-
pected premium after accounting for selection that a given firm would observe
if it removed the ATP. Given the potentially quite strong selection in the data
(our estimated P is rather large), it is not possible to infer the value of β from
either Y or the difference in realized premiums.
The value of β can be bounded using the method in Lee (2009). The proposed
bounds rely on the assumption of monotonicity of the effect of ATPs on the
shareholder votes. We find no effect of those proposals on either the takeover probability or the
premium. The results are particularly different for Table IA.VII, Panel B, in the Internet Ap-
pendix, which estimates the effects over the entire vote support, while they are heterogeneous
and imprecise in Table IA.VII, Panel A, in the Internet Appendix, near the discontinuity, where
we cannot always rule out the possibility that they are different from those in Table II. Taken
as a whole, the results suggest that what drives our main results is not just some signal around
shareholder activism (as proposed by Bach and Metzger (2015)), which should arise after any type
of vote, but rather an effect that appears only after the removal of an ATP.
25 The conversion factors take into account in which part of the distribution of votes they are
estimated, to match the estimation sample in our paper. The conversion factor at the discontinuity
comes from Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012). For results outside the discontinuity, we use
estimates from Popadak (2014) (using data from Shark Repellent) and Bach and Metzger (2015)
(using data from Voting Analytics). Note that the data used to calculate the conversion factors
differ from ours in terms of period, provision type, and vote measurement, so they have to be taken
as approximations, given that the marginal firms that implement proposals may differ across
them.
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selection criterion. That is, the assumption that the causal effect of ATPs on the
probability of a takeover can be heterogeneous, but must run in the same direc-
tion across firms, (i.e., always positive or always negative).26 The bounds are
calculated by trimming the distribution of premiums of the treated group. The
trimming procedure can be seen as implementing the best- and worst-case se-
lection scenario, given the estimated change in the probability of a takeover.27
A. Bounding β in the Whole Vote Support
In Table V, Panel A, column (1) estimates the bounds proposed by Lee (2009)
calculated for the entire vote support. The procedure requires that the esti-
mates of the coefficients that determine selection in the first stage be inter-
preted as causal. We achieve this by using the same linear reweighting as in
Table IV, that is, we use the weights obtained using the propensity score and
we assume that the same CIA holds. This method yields estimates of β for
the four-week premium that are bounded between a nonstatistically signifi-
cant –2.3% and a significant 5.8%. This means that the direct premium effect
of dropping an ATP on a given targeted firm is positive.
The remaining columns in Panel A of Table V use additional premium mea-
sures in different windows for the purposes of robustness. Column (2) reports
the effect on the target premium computed as the change in price one week
before announcement until completion (i.e., a shorter run-up) and column
(3) reports abnormal returns using the Fama-French factors plus momentum
(FFM) factors in a short window (±five days) around the announcement. These
shorter premium windows show significant positive bounds both for the lower
and the upper bounds (between 5% and 11.5%). Columns (4) to (6) employ
longer time windows. Column (4) reports CARs for a very long window—from
the day of the vote to the takeover announcement day plus one. This speci-
fication accounts for the fact that some of the expected effect of the merger
could have been incorporated as early as the day of the vote. Columns (5) and
(6) report the CARs using the FFM factors from (–42, 5) trading days around
the announcement and days (–42, until completion), respectively. These latter
tests allow us to assess the difference between using announcement and com-
pletion dates. All estimates unambiguously show a positive premium effect.
What is noteworthy here is that while, by construction, a bounding strategy
(such as Lee (2009)) is likely to give broad bounds, the results that we obtain
allow us to reject the hypothesis that the effect on the conditional premium is
26Note that this is a weaker assumption than the standard monotonicity assumption necessary
for instrumental variable regressions.
27 In our application, the calculation of the bounds involves first calculating the increase in
the probability of a takeover induced by the treatment, relative to the probability of the treated
firms q = [(Pr(Z* > 0|D = 1)) – Pr(Z* > 0|D = 0)]/Pr(Z* > 0|D = 1). Then, from the observed
population of mergers in the treated group (those for which the ATP proposal passes), we compute
the upper (q) and lower (1 – q) quantile of observed premiums. The upper (lower) bound of β is then
calculated as the average of observed takeover premiums above (below) the lower (upper) quantile
minus the average premium of the control group (firms that did not pass the ATP proposal).
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Table V
Target Conditional Premiums, Lee Bounds Estimates
This table reports the results of the effect of passing a G-index proposal on different premium measures for the target company. Panel A estimates
are obtained using the Lee (2009) methodology and propensity score matching to account for selection in the universe of targeted companies. Panel
B estimates restrict the sample to votes within the (–10,10) interval. Column (1) reports the effect on the target premium computed as the change
in price four weeks before announcement until completion. Column (2) reports the effect on the target premium computed as the change in price one
week before announcement until completion. Columns (3) and (4) report premiums based on cumulative abnormal returns using the FFM factors for
different windows (±5 days) and (Vote/+1 day), both relative to the announcement date. The run-ups for the target company are computed as the
abnormal returns from (–42, 5) trading days around the announcement in column (5) and as the abnormal return (–42, until Completion) in column
(6), always using the FFM factors. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Simple Vote Rule
Premium Four Eeeks before
Announce. to Completion
Premium One week before
Announce. to Completion
CAR (–5,5)
FFM
CAR
(Vote,Ann+1)
Run-up (–42,5)
FFM
Run-up (–42,
Completion) FFM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Upper and Lower Sharp Lee Bounds (with Propensity Score Weights, Full Sample)
Lower Bound Estimation
Yes −2.3 4.95* 5.27** 2.6 2.72 3.29
(3.23) (2.9) (2.11) 19.3 (2.93) (3.39)
Z −0.71 1.71 2.49 0.13 0.93 0.84
Upper Bound Estimation
Yes 5.75** 11.49*** 10.12*** 52.24** 9.17*** 16.52***
(2.89) (2.48) (1.92) (16.16) (2.61) (3.93)
R2/Z 1.99 4.62 5.25 3.23 3.51 4.80
# Sel. Obs. 418 416 418 406 418 408
Observations 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
Panel B: Upper and Lower Sharp Lee Bounds in (–10, 10) Interval
Lower Bound Estimation
Yes −2.02 −1.18 −1.79 −52.24** 2.53 −0.27
(4.57) (4.56) (3.23) (23.1) (5.27) (7.45)
Z −0.44 −0.26 −0.55 −2.25 0.48 −0.04
Upper Bound Estimation
Yes 14.63** 22.93*** 11.06*** 47.73* 20.96*** 27.39***
(5.99) (6.80) (4.11) (26.96) (5.71) (8.279)
R2/Z 2.44 3.37 2.69 1.77 3.67 3.30
# Sel. Obs. 135 134 133 124 133 130
Observations 883 883 883 883 883 883
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negative.28 The bound estimates solve the selection problem and rely on very
weak assumptions at the cost of not determining the coefficient with precision.
However, in our case the bounds rule out the possibility that the conditional
premium is negative. In Section VII, we explore a number of hypotheses that
may explain this nonnegative effect.
The results of this section use the full distribution of votes as supported
by the CIA assumption tests of Section IV.B.1. These are necessary inputs
that allow us to calculate the decomposition of the unconditional premium in
Section VI.
B. Bounding β Near the Discontinuity Threshold
An alternative approach is to perform the decomposition of the unconditional
premium using results at the majority threshold. Unfortunately, the bounding
technique relies on having an empirical distribution of votes and mergers when
vote outcomes tend to the majority threshold, which does not exist in a finite
sample. Alternatively, we can rely on a bandwidth around the discontinuity
that is sufficiently narrow to approach the RDD intuition but sufficiently broad
to get meaningful results.
In Table V, Panel B, we report results on a 10% vote interval around the
discontinuity. The results are generally consistent with those in Panel A but
sometimes less precise at the lower bound. There are two mechanical reasons
for this loss of precision. First, as we approach the discontinuity, we have fewer
observations and mergers and hence we lose power. Second, the effect on the
probability of a merger is higher in the RDD results than for the matching
estimator, resulting in more severe selection problems that take the bounds
further apart. In general, it is not possible to maintain a reasonable sample
size and take the limit of the bounds to the discontinuity without imposing
additional functional assumptions.29,30
The results show that the upper bound is consistently positive and signif-
icant. The lower bound is generally statistically indistinguishable from zero,
except for the most volatile premium measure (that measuring returns from
the vote until merger completion in column (4)), which yields broad and unin-
formative bounds.31
28 All of the results in Table V, Panels A and B, are based on the simple vote rule. Results are
similar using the adjusted vote rule. See Table IA.X, Panels A and B, in the Internet Appendix.
29 In Table V, Panel B, we obtain bounds for the conditional merger premium (four-week and
one-week premium) for different bandwidths around the discontinuity. These include the intervals
used by the local regression estimators in Table III with their relevant weights. At very close
intervals, the combination of a smaller sample andmore severe selection problems generates broad
bounds. These are mostly distributed on the positive side, especially for the one-week premium,
which is less volatile, but a negative lower bound cannot be ruled out.
30 See also Table IA.VIII in the Internet Appendix for an RDD calculation of the unconditional
premiums in Table VI.
31 Throughout the paper, we use raw returns after checking that our results are not driven by
outliers. We replicated all of our main tests, using winsorized variables, and obtain similar results.
These results can be found in earlier versions of this paper.
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VI. Decomposing the Unconditional Premium: Takeover Probability,
Takeover Premium, and Selection Effects
We now have all the elements necessary to evaluate the contribution of
price, probability, and selection effects to the overall estimated unconditional
takeover premium Y using the decomposition in equation (2).32 We run the
decomposition for the full sample (based on the CIA-validated matching model)
and for the ±10% interval. Table VI reports the results.
For the full sample, we find that 52% of the premium is driven by the
takeover probability effect (note that the treatment effect on the takeover prob-
ability is estimated without selection bias, so this number does not change with
the bounding exercise). Using our lower bound estimate for β (–2.3), we find
that selection accounts for 61% and that the premium contributes negatively
(–13%). However, from Table V, the lower bound premium is not statistically
distinguishable from zero and other windows for the premium yield unambigu-
ously positive estimates. With our upper bound estimate for β (5.7), 32% of the
unconditional premium is explained by the effect on premiums, holding the
population constant, and 17% by selection.
At the discontinuity (Panel B), the effect of takeover probabilities the largest
at 57% and the premium effect ranges from 84% to –12% (although the neg-
ative estimate is based on a negative premium effect that is statistically in-
distinguishable from zero). The selection effect at the discontinuity cannot be
signed, although it is potentially large, ranging between 55% and –41%.
The results above imply that while half of the value implications of drop-
ping an ATP can be attributed to an increased probability of experiencing a
takeover, nonnegligible amounts are driven by the positive premium. Selection
effects are positive and large for the full sample and imprecisely estimated
for the RDD sample, although still potentially large. This paints a very dif-
ferent picture than existing literature (which does not address selection and
endogeneity) and shows that failing to account for the endogenous selection of
targets induces substantial bias.
VII. Understanding Positive Target Premiums
We next explore the possible drivers for the positive effect on the conditional
target premium by looking at what else changes when firms pass a proposal.
Given that the population of merged companies changes with the removal of
an ATP, we analyze these effects using Lee bounds (full descriptive statistics of
all the variables in this section can be found in Table IA.I in the Internet Ap-
pendix). We start by analyzing the effects for the Simple Vote in whole matched
sample in Table VII and then focus on the effects closes to the discontinuity (in
32We take the estimates for P and Y from column (1) of Table II (RDD) and columns (1)
and (3) of Table IV (matching). We compute Pr[Z*>0 | D=1] = 13.5 using the probabilities of each
observation being treated and E[Y | D=0 , Z*>0] =29.6 using the probabilities of each observation
not being treated from the matching model. The bounds on β and the selection term come from
column (1) in Table V.
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Table VI
Decomposing the Shareholder Value Effect
This table provides a decomposition of the change in shareholder value induced by the passing
of a proposal to eliminate an ATP. We provide an estimate of the three components that affect
shareholder value—changes in the premium, changes in the probability of a takeover, and changes
in the population of firms that are put into play. We provide both the lower and the upper bound
values since we use Lee (2009) to estimate the change in takeover premium β. In column (1),
the Change in Shareholder Value is the unconditional takeover premium under the CIA model in
Panel A, and the RDD IK estimate in Panel B. In column (2), Premium Effect is the change in
takeover premium β times the baseline probability of merger (Pr[Z*>0 | D = 1]). In column (3),
Takeover Probability Effect is the result of the change in the probability of merger ({Pr[Z*>0 |
D = 1] – Pr[Z*>0 | D = 0]} times the baseline premium (E[Y | D = 0 , Z*>0]). In column (4),
we provide an estimate of the selection effect. Using the probabilities of the matching model, we
calculate that the baseline probability is 14.4 and the baseline premium is 32.7.
Simple Vote Rule
Change in
Shareholder Value
Premium
Effect
Takeover Probability
Effect Selection Effect
Y (1) β * Pr[Z*>0 |
D = 1] (2)
{Pr[Z*>0 | D = 1] –
Pr[Z*>0 | D = 0]} *
E[Y | D = 0 , Z*>0]
(3)
Pr[Z*>0 | D = 1] * {
E[Y | D = 1 , Z*>0]
– E[Y | D = 1 , V >
– µ2 ]} (4)
Panel A: Using Validated Matching for Uncond. Premium and Probability from Table IV
Lower Bound Estimation of β = −2.3
2.59% −0.33 1.34 1.59
−13% 52% 61%
Upper Bound Estimation of β = 5.7
2.59% 0.82 1.34 0.43
32% 52% 17%
Panel B: Using RDD-IK for Unconditional Premium and Probability from Table II (–10,10)
Lower Bound Estimation of β = −2.02
2.61% −0.30 1.48 1.42
−12% 57% 55%
Upper Bound Estimation of β = 14.6
2.61% 2.19 1.48 −1.06
84% 57% −41%
the ±10% interval) in Table VIII. Note that these are not only different esti-
mation strategies but also that the effects are evaluated at different points of
the distribution of votes (weighted average of the full sample versus close-call
votes) that can yield different point estimates.33 Table IA.XII, Panels A and B,
in the Internet Appendix replicate the results using the Adjusted vote. Since
the results are extremely similar for both vote definitions, we discuss only the
33 See SectionII of the Internet Appendix for a discussion of the heterogeneous effects of ATPs
at different levels of vote support and for an analysis of the difference between the two samples.
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Simple vote here and refer the reader to the Internet Appendix for the exact
point estimates using the Adjusted vote.
We first evaluate the total value/synergies created by deals in less protected
versus more protected firms. We find that voting to remove an ATP leads to
more value-creating deals using a number of different measures, both for the
full sample (Panel A of Table VII) and for close-call votes in the in the ±10%
interval (Panel A of Table VIII). For example, for the full sample (for close-call
votes), bidder and target firms are between 16% and 28% (14% and 38%) more
likely to belong to the same two-digit SIC industry relative to a sample mean of
63%. These results indicate that the deals are more likely to be related merg-
ers with greater synergies than financial or diversifying mergers. Column (2)
shows that in less protected deals, targets are matched with relatively larger
acquirers, as measured by their market capitalization. The ratio of target to
acquirer market capitalization four weeks before the announcement is 0.7 to
1.3 lower in the full sample (relative to a mean of 1.11 and standard deviation
of 4.35; the interval is not significant for close-call votes). This finding suggests
that on average the positively selected targets are matched to relatively more
valuable and potentially productive acquirers, but this effect is not present
closer to the discontinuity. If we cumulate the dollar value of the premium of
the target and the acquirer, which measures the total value/synergies created
by the deal, the upper bound estimate of the effect is quite large and positive
both in dollar value terms (up to US$7.3 billion higher for the full sample and
US$9.2 billion higher for close-call votes, column (3)) and as a share of total
market cap (up to 14% of the target and acquirer’s value for the full sample
and 22% for close-call votes, column (4)). The lower bound of the synergy esti-
mates is not significant in either sample. Nonetheless, the results suggest that,
if anything, there is net additional value creation in the market when ATPs are
removed, with this true both for close-call votes and for the full sample. This
finding is important as it suggests that the presence of ATPs suppresses the
realization of deals that have more value-creating potential and hence poten-
tially represents a net loss to the economy.
The results above indicate that less protected firms receive a higher pre-
mium and the deals of those firms create more market value. But what hap-
pens to the acquirer premium? Here we find differences between the two sam-
ples, as can be seen in columns (5) to (8) in Tables VII and VIII. In the full
sample we cannot clearly sign the acquirer premium—it does not seem that
acquirers are systematically able to extract a higher share of the synergies
created given that the results depend heavily on the measure of premium
used. In contrast, for close-call votes (Table VIII) we find a systematic pattern:
the upper bound of the effect on the acquirer premium is always significant,
large, and positive, where the lower bound is insignificant but also positive in
several cases. We interpret these results as indicating that acquirers can ex-
tract/appropriate some of the value created in close-call votes, but less so over
the full sample of deals.
The share of the surplus extracted by acquirers can change with changes in
relative bargaining power when targets are less protected or with changes in
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Table VII
Merger Effects—Lee Bounds with Propensity Score Weights (Full Sample)
This table reports results on the effect of passing a G-index proposal on different merger outcomes. All estimates are obtained using the Lee (2009)
methodology to account for selection in the universe of targeted companies. Panel A presents results for different measures of matching and acquirer
premium. Column (1) reports the effect on the likelihood of the target and acquirer being in the same two-digit SIC code, column (2) on the relative size
of target versus acquirer, column (3) on a measure of total synergies, and column (4) on total synergies as a percentage of total market capitalization.
Column (5) reports the effect on the acquirer premium (change in price four weeks before announcement until one day after). Column (6) reports a
premium based on cumulative abnormal returns (FFM) on a (–5/+5) window around announcement. The run-up of the acquirer is measured as the
abnormal return on a (–42/+5) window around announcement in column (7) and as (–42/Completion) in column (8). Panel B, columns (1) to (3) report
the effect on the number of bidders, the deal being unsolicited and the deal being challenged, column (4) reports the effect on the percentage of stock
paid for the target, and columns (5) and (6) present the effects on activism events. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **,
and ***, respectively.
Simple Vote Rule
Panel A: Value Creation and Value Split
Matching Acquirer Premium
Same
Two-Digit
SIC
Size Target
Rel. to
Acquiror
Total
Synergies
FFM
Total Syn-
ergy/Total
Mkt Cap
Acquirer
Premium
Acquirer
CAR(–5,5)
Run-Up
CAR(–42,5)
Run-Up CAR
(–42,Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lower Bound Estimation
Yes 0.161** −1.31** −321,515 −0.03 −8.81*** −4.46*** −7.14** −3.12
(0.06) (0.51) (2,446,489) (0.03) (3.18) (1.37) (2.90) (4.45)
Z 2.30 −2.57 −0.13 −1.01 −2.77 −3.25 −2.46 −0.70
Upper Bound Estimation
Yes 0.28*** −0.73 7,317,733*** 0.14*** −0.25 1.06 5.78** 17.6***
(0.07) (0.48) (1,854,619) (0.03) (2.35) (1.38) (3.27) (3.74)
Z 3.95 −1.53 3.95 4.63 0.11 0.77 1.76 4.7
#Sel 418 356 262 262 281 278 278 271
Observations 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
(Continued)
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Table VII—Continued
Panel B: Competition and Activism
Competition Activism
Number of
Bidders
Unsolicited
Deal
Challenged
Deal
Stock
Percentage
Num 13D Events
Two Years Prior
Dummy 13D Event
Two Years Prior
Annoucement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lower Bound Estimation
Yes 0.14** 0.039 0.10*** −26.83*** 0.051 0.072
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (7.22) (0.077) (0.044)
Z 2.20 1.27 2.66 −3.71 0.66 1.62
Upper Bound Estimation
Yes 0.315*** 0.12*** 0.22*** −3.46 0.445*** 0.289***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (5.39) (0.083) (0.074)
I 6.40 5.01 7.26 −0.64 5.33 3.87
#sel 418 418 418 217 639 639
Observations 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
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Table VIII
Merger Effects—Lee Bounds in (–10,+10) Interval
This table reports results on the effect of passing a G-index proposal on different merger outcomes. All estimates are obtained using Lee (2009) bounds
on the restricted (–10,10) vote interval. Panel A presents results for different measures of matching and acquirer premium. Column (1) reports the
effect on the likelihood of the target and acquirer being in the same two-digit SIC code, column (2) on the relative size of target versus acquirer,
column (3) on a measure of total synergies, and column (4) total synergies as a percentage of total market capitalization. Column (5) reports the effect
on the acquirer premium (change in price four weeks before announcement until one day after). Column (6) reports a premium based on cumulative
abnormal returns (FFM) on a (–5/+5) window around announcement. The run-up of the acquirer is measured as the abnormal return on a (–42/+5)
window around announcement in column (7) and as (–42/Completion) in column (8). Panel B, columns (1) to (3) report the effect on the number of
bidders, the deal being unsolicited, and the deal being challenged, column (4) reports the effect on the percentage of stock paid for the target, and
columns (5) and (6) show the effects on activism events. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Simple Vote Rule
Panel A: Value Creation and Value Split
Matching Acquirer Premium
Same
Two-Digit
SIC
Size Target
Rel. to
Acquiror
Total
Synergies
FFM
Total Syn-
ergy/Total
Mkt Cap
Acquirer
Premium
Acquirer
CAR(−5,5)
Runup
CAR
(−42,5)
Runup CAR
(−42,Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lower Bound Estimation
Yes 0.14 −0.24 5,461,211* 0.07 −1.81 −0.42 3.20 8.44
(0.094) (1.03) (3,003,063) (0.074) (3.35) (2.28) (4.67) (7.33)
Z 1.46 −0.23 1.83 0.94 −0.54 −0.19 0.69 1.15
Upper Bound Estimation
Yes 0.38*** −0.05 9,208,777*** 0.22*** 7.20** 4.68** 13.4*** 22.94***
(0.061) (0.34) (2,876,863) (0.049) (3.52) (2.65) (4.82) (6.36)
Z 6.18 −0.15 3.20 4.42 2.04 2.04 2.78 3.61
#sel 135 140 101 101 103 103 104 103
Observations 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 883
(Continued)
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Table VIII—Continued
Panel B: Competition and Activism
Competition Activism
Number of
Bidders
Unsolicited
Deal
Challenged
Deal
Stock
Percentage
Num 13D Events
Two Years Prior
Annouce.
Dummy13D Event
Two Years Prior
Ann.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lower Bound Estimation
Yes −0.30** −0.12** −0.22*** −28.08** −0.142 −0.054
(0.08) (0.042) (0.051) (11.04) (0.200) (0.096)
Z −3.75 −3.0 −4.21 −2.54 −0.71 −0.56
Upper Bound Estimation
Yes 0.16 0.04 0.076 −10.43 −0.049 −0.025
(0.15) (0.072) (0.09) (11.03) (0.132) (0.076)
Z 1.05 1.05 0.79 −0.94 −0.38 −0.34
#sel 135 135 135 88 240 240
Observations 883 883 883 883 883 883
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the extent of competition for targets. We cannot measure bargaining power
directly, but we can capture competition using several proxies. In Panel B,
columns (1) to (4) of Tables VII and VIII we find that competition increases
for the full sample, whereas it does not (and actually seems to decrease) for
the sample at close-call votes, which would explain the difference in results on
the acquirer premium. In the full sample, less protected deals observe between
0.14 and 0.32 more bidders (the mean number of bidders is 1.24 and over 90%
of firms have only one or two bidders). In addition, the probability of deal be-
ing a challenged is between 10% and 22% higher (sample mean is 16%). These
effects are statistically and economically significant. Targets also appear to be
subject to more unsolicited deals (with 4% to 12% higher probability, although
the lower bound result is not significant), and observe a higher fraction of the
deal settled in cash (indicating more competition as in Offenberg and Pirinsky
(2015)).34 For close-call votes, the lower bounds are negative and significant
but the upper bound is of the opposite sign and equally large, which may be
due to the lack of power to estimate effects in this subsample. However, the
overall picture is not of an increase in competition but rather if anything, a
decline.
We interpret the evidence above as suggesting that voting to remove an ATP
makes entering the bidding contest less attractive in close-call votes, reduces
competition, and allows the acquirer to appropriate some of the surplus cre-
ated. In contrast, for nonclose-call votes, competition between bidders erodes
any premium for the acquirer.
Finally, we explore the potential role of activist investors in delivering higher
premiums.35 Greenwood and Schor (2009) provide evidence that activists can
put firms into play and therefore collect high takeover premiums. We find that,
in the full sample, among firms that are taken over, the likelihood of a 13D
activist campaign prior to a merger announcement is higher for firms that
passed a proposal to get rid of an ATP.36 This results does not hold, however, in
the close-call sample. Activist investors may therefore be an additional channel
through which higher premiums are observed for the full sample, but not for
the close-call votes sample.
34 The use of cash in takeovers has also been linked to overvalued targets (see Shleifer and
Vishny (2003), Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016)). Given that we are isolating the effect of ATPs
on a given target, our results suggest that dropping an ATP may lead to the overvaluation of the
target. However, over- and undervaluation of targets is more likely to operate through the selection
of targets, and such effects are captured by the selection part of our decomposition (see SectionVI).
35 An activist investor that acquires more than 5% beneficial ownership is required to disclose
crossing the 5% threshold in Schedule 13D within 10 days of crossing the threshold if it intends to
influence control.
36We found that the unconditional probability of being the target of activists after passing a
vote is unchanged (unreported).
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VIII. Conclusion
In spite of the attention devoted to the consequences of ATPs, there is lim-
ited empirical evidence of their effect on takeovers in terms of probabilities
and premiums or of their effect on value creation/destruction economy wide.
To investigate the effect of ATPs, one must first jointly assess their effect on
takeover probabilities, merger premiums, and target selection.
This paper provides estimates—addressing the endogenous adoption of pro-
visions and target selection—of the effects of ATPs and identifies several chan-
nels through which they destroy value. First, having an ATP in place reduces
the likelihood of a takeover happening. Second, the deals that take place when
a firm is protected by an ATP are “worse” along several dimensions: they in-
volve worse targets, they involve smaller acquirers, they are more likely to be
between firms in unrelated businesses and hence are less likely to create value,
and they create fewer synergies.
The more protected the firm, the lower the premium paid for the target.
We find evidence that for the full sample this is due at least in part to the
fact that more protected firms attract less competitive bidding. This is likely
because ATPs deter bidders, and also because the worse the firm’s governance,
the more difficult it will be to realize synergies. This mechanism does not apply,
however, to close-call votes, where we see no increase in competitive bidding
when less protected and where bidders can realize a positive premium.
In sum , we find no apparent trade-off between takeover price (the premium)
and probability—a trade-off typically presented by managers as the rationale
for the adoption of ATPs. In our results, both price and probability are signifi-
cantly lower when an ATP is in place. In fact, the gains from dropping an ATP
accrue almost exclusively to the target shareholders.
We find similar results using different identification strategies that employ
different vote definitions and are run on different subsamples, each with its
own strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, we obtain causal effects at the
vote discontinuity for takeover probabilities and unconditional premiums. We
are also able to bound the effects on the conditional premium for an interval
around the discontinuity as well as away from the discontinuity using CIA-
validated matching. When using the latter, we find that our results apply to
most of the support of vote outcomes. Thus, while our results cannot necessar-
ily be extrapolated to firms that never hold such shareholder votes, the evi-
dence suggests that they do apply to the majority of firms in this population,
which is about-one third of the S&P 1500.
Existing literature fails to account for selection when computing the
takeover premium.We show that this selection effect can be quite large, and we
provide a framework for assessing how much of the overall expected premium
associated with removing an ATP is driven by probability, price (premium),
and selection effects.
Although we present new results and answer a number of previously unan-
swered questions, our analysis leaves a number of questions open. For exam-
ple, we take ATPs to be identical and do not consider heterogeneity across
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types of proposal or firms. Furthermore, if takeover deals are good for share-
holders of the target firms and for the economy as a whole, why do so many
firms keep ATPs in place? Given that the firms in our sample tend to be large
listed companies, our results would be consistent with the view that ATPs have
a positive role in young entrepreneurial firms, but become value-destroying for
more mature firms (see Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi (2015, 2017)). There is am-
ple evidence of inefficiencies in internal governance and the political economy
of decision-making within firms that make such provisions sticky, and mature
firms may find themselves off equilibrium with an above-optimal level of anti-
takeover protection. We leave these important questions to future research.
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